Rather than proceeding by close argument to demonstrate the actual existence and necessity of Arab unity, passages such as these assert that ethnicity, religious and linguistic identity and the like determine the successful or unsuccessful construction of socialism. This may be contrasted to the focus on the mode of production as the starting point for an analytical examination of the building of socialism in any society. Without questioning the tremendous impact of nationality-based factors in explaining political dynamics in human societies, one cannot help but be struck at the disregard for that which European socialists have traditionally considered the heart of the entire matter: examination of social systems on the basis of their organization of productive relations and the growth of productive forces, the social division of labor, and the separation of large segments of society into mutually hostile classes. Here, then, is a major distinction between the perspective of European and Egyptian socialists. 4 Why is it that there must be a single Khrushchev seemed to be implying that the stress on ethnic unity might be less relevant for the construction of socialism than as a framework for the demogogic manipulation of political action in general. According to the reasoning behind this implication, therefore, the importance of unity resides in the role unification plays in the power-political aspirations of certain elites. 6 Thus far, it has been argued that Egypt's socialist theoreticians consider nationalism, nationality and national consciousness as the ne plus ultra of their system. The break with Marxism and neo-Marxism could not be clearer. Lenin, for example, in one of his earliest tracts, ridiculed the notion of a 'Russian' road to socialism that could bypass capitalism.7 Marx did, at one point, raise the possibility that the Russian commune might serve as the mechanism by which Russian society might move into a postcapitalist stage. But this was an isolated instance and surely does not represent Marx's thinking in its total frame and system. 8 It is true that the Marxist-Leninists have since gone through a number of stages in their thinking on the role of nationalism or nationality in the building of socialism.9 But even the Yugoslavs, whose revisionism largely brought about Khrushchev's ideological innovation of 'separate paths to socialism' in 1955 and 1956 consider the national phenomenon as a less than decisive factor. To the Yugoslavs the doctrine of separate paths, far from glorifying the 'Yugoslav Idea' or nation, is an instrument to maintain distance from Soviet intervention in their country. Egyptians, on the other hand, tend to view nation, nationality and nationalism as ends in themselves. While the Romanians, to take another example from Eastern Europe, demand autonomy from the Bolshevik-Soviet model, they place the emphasis not upon ethnicity but upon ecological peculiarities that make it difficult for them to follow that model. Similarly, when the term 'national communism' came into use in connection with events in Poland and Hungary in the mid-fifties, observers seemed to agree that the concept signified the absence of certain structural characteristics in these societies, 6 Here, Arab unity becomes, like religion for Marx But the Egyptian socialists adopt another view toward 'separate paths' To them, nationalism and unity lie at the heart of what makes the socialist engine run. They are not the lubrication that contains and smoothens the process but rather the power source itself. This is the difference, between nation variables as the energy supply as opposed to nation variables as comprising the engine block within which this energy is given off. Thus, if one may carry this metaphor to the end, European socialist advocates of separate paths seem to mean that the suspension in which the whole system rests must be less viscous than that in which the Soviet model has been suspended. Egyptian socialist advocates of separate paths, however, feel that the system itself cannot run on the basis of cleavages in society that must work themselves out through mutual collision and struggle. The power source must be replaced. In the end, European socialists tend to view their differences with the Soviets as differences in degree: the common denominator is still dialectics and contradiction as the motor of history. The Egyptians view their differences with all other socialists as differences in kind, stressing the indivisibility of the Arab people as the engine. To the contrary, the analyses of Egypt's interpreters of Arab socialism seem to perpetuate the classic and medieval Islamic mode of both intuitional and a priori12 thought; this has hampered serious Egyptian scholarly work in social science inquiry. The dearth of a posteriori reasoning and sociological method may, at worst, lead to the substitution of assertion and polemic for fact and logic. To borrow an image from geometry, this resembles the use of the very theorem one is trying to prove in the form of a hypothesis somewhere in the proof itself. In this case, the theorem is that the achievement of Arab unity will result in socialism. In the process of proving this, a short cut is taken, and it is assumed that by and large the Arab people have common interests due to their exploitation by internal overlords and external imperialists; they yearn to expunge this exploitation; they feel that unity will make this possible . . . and suddenly it is asserted that hence [sic!], once they attain their unity, no more exploitation will exist, socialism will be achieved (quod erat demonstrandum!). This pro- cedure skips the crucial step of demonstrating how the removal of the twin sources of exploitation over the masses (internal overlords) and the upward bound, socially mobile middle sectors (external imperialists) will solve the tension between precisely these two social groups.13 It is, after all, possible to attain unity of consciousness of ethnic identity and culture without attaining unity of interests among the diverse corporate groups embraced by that culture.
It will be seen later, below, that despite keen interest among Egyptian intellectuals in problems of political theory and philosophy, one will need to look long and hard to find a systematic and coherent ideological statement of the regime's principles and objectives. Despite the significance of democratic cooperative socialism to the regime, it is odd that the current body of scholarship produced by the country's intellectuals is couched in very general and dogmatic terms. Thus, even the Egyptian socialists themselves may be confused about the meaning of democratic cooperative socialism14 the construction of which is taking place under the aegis of the 'popular alliance of the working forces'.
The foregoing analysis of Egyptian interpretations of socialism accords with earlier studies reflecting the lack of concern with analytical rigor in fashioning an ideology.15 According to one scholar, 'formal ideology' is 'relatively unimportant'.16 This is not to say that concern is lacking to explain politics in terms of legitimizing ideas. But these ideas have been turned toward the negative task of dispelling positions and concepts judged to be hopelessly obsolete, antediluvian and counterproductive to development. Beyond this the Egyptian military regime is unwilling to go, and it has even been hostile to intellectuals and to innovative ideologi- well known, the socialization patterns in Islamic civilization stress the subordination of one's own will to that of higher authorities: God, the Prophet, religious leaders, one's elders. It would be a wonder if Muslim man's visceral reaction were to be as Sayf al-Dawlah suggests; or at least, it would be odd to think of him making this statement as a secular credo. The point is that politics and religion are so intermingled in his mind that freedom for him means freedom within the fold to be a good member of the community. It would thus be freedom to continue as part of, rather than freedom to break away from, the community. In the last analysis, this distinguishes freedom as a dynamic factor from freedom as a passive, inert one.
Nevertheless, Arab socialist analysts in Egypt broadly imply that it is the Western approach to freedom (as a dynamic factor) that equips the new Arab man's consciousness. Man is at the core of Egypt's socialism posing the question on which is the more important has led us down the wrong path. Man has always chosen to live within a social system. In fact, it is the social organization and division of production that crystallize his life. 'Life is fashioned according to the laws of production that govern it'. For Ahmad, therefore, it is not the individual and the development of his potentialities to the maximum that is crucial. Rather, he stresses the need to guarantee the life and future of men and to meet their physical and cultural needs. But Ahmad, like al-Razzaz, would agree that the power of the State must be curbed in order to make this possible.23 Here, too, the rationalist tradition underlying Western political theory and sociology since the Enlightenment period infuses Egyptians with the inspiration to defend humanism. Taking (by asserting that man's biological needs, curiosity, will and freedom, and desire for equality collectively are responsible for historical movement and development); but he stops short of a deeper analysis and in fact repudiates idealism, metaphysics, entropy, infinity and dialectical materialism 'in so far as they constitute a method of inquiry into man, his society, culture and history'.27 Unfortunately al-Rimawi is reduced to making ex-cathedra statements that man is free by nature; and we are once again struck by the proclivity for avoiding abstract theoretical explication in the eagerness to postulate certain givens.
Among But, Sayf al-Dawlah notes, the Soviets will only go so far and no further. Thus, they adhere to the thesis that man is capable of understanding the laws of nature and social development; and by their knowledge of these laws, they necessarily take their place in the movement of history. Yet, this is tantamount to dismissing man altogether. For the logical conclusion of the Soviet position is that man can only understand, not change, historical development.
The quarrel that the Egyptian has picked with the Soviets thus boils down to the ability or inability of man to change the course of history. The maximum the Soviets are willing to concede is that man uses his knowledge of the laws of nature and society to make them serve him. But this does not constitute an admission that man can alter the course of things The emphasis appears to be on man being able to make his life more efficient, more secure, more enjoyable. The Egyptian, by contrast, wants to go further and acknowledge that man does have the power to alter the broad sweep of historical development that encompasses him.
The Egyptian agrees with the fundamental principle that all movement is dialectical in nature. Hence, his quarrel with Marxism-Leninism is not that it is based on the dialectical principle. Rather, he repudiates the materialist parameters that allegedly restrict man's influence to one of passive comprehension of the world about him In place of materialism he erects the dialectics of man, a more dynamic paradigm which claims 'the law of dialectics is a law peculiar to man, alone'. Man's development in history takes place according to characteristic laws that are specific to him Religion plays a role as the leaven that allows the society to grow and develop itself without facing the dangers of material forces and the general tendency toward randomness and entropy that secularization tends to foster. This contemporary view represents a change in perspective as far as religion is concerned. These present-day socialist theoreticians seem to have latent social contract ideas. Accordingly, society comes into being not necessarily because it is the natural human community to work the will of God on earth. Rather, society arises in order to enable men the better to realize their own human possibilities. The socialist theorists are therefore stressing the existence of a separate political function and sphere, reserving for religion a different and more private realm. Man, therefore, We know that Marx regarded social conflict and contradiction as the causal agents of change. The Egyptians do not agree and insist that development occurs according to a dynamic of fusion, not fission. This means two important things: (1) unity must be achieved by a process of reconciliation and harmonization-it is the precondition for successful socialist construction; (2) the motor of man's historical development is the nation-state idea, founded on a common basis of ethnicity and religious belief (Rodinson's 'dynamique globale').
As far as the metaphysical question of freedom versus necessity is concerned, Marxist theory is not entirely different from Egypt's Arab socialism. The emphasis both place on man as the creator of his history is notable.56 But, in point of fact, the Egyptians ignore this aspect of Marxism completely. Thus, to Marx, man is the substance of existence, the world around him is the form. Yet, this position tends to be eclipsed in the mind of most persons, who refer to the universal social laws for which Marxist theory is so famous as evidence of the determinism of Marxism.
Egypt's Arab socialism attaches importance to the dignity of man. It denies that man is determined in his behavior. However, its leading philosopher, 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah, does admit that necessity operates in the physical universe and that natural laws occur irrespective of man's existence and/or involvement. Yet, due to certain 'special laws characteristic of man' the human being can overcome natural forces. Sayf al-Dawlah accuses Marxism of imposing a rigid framework on man, who must cope with his situation as best he can. Yet, Marx himself wrote: 'man is no abstract being, squatting outside the world'.57 And Marx showed his indignation with the view of man as the plaything of forces and in 'fantastic isolation' from reality. 58 Marx deplored the idea that man should only try to comprehend his universe, criticizing all philosophers because they 'have only interpreted the world, in various ways', and noting, instead, that 'the point, however, is to change it'. 59 Of course, Egypt's Arab socialism breaks sharply with Marxism on the question of transcendentalism. It is possible, evidently, for Christians, for example, to be Marxists; and at least one scholar of international repute has called himself a 'transcendental Marxist'.60 Marx's views on religion are too well known to be introduced here. The Egyptian socialist interpretation of Marxism is that because of its rejection of organized religion, it rejects morality and ethics as a whole. 61 Even on the question of religion, however, it is useful to distinguish within Egyptian socialism between those who regard Islam as indispensable for socialism and those who consider it in more instrumental terms. In the latter case, Islam becomes an aid to secularization, although this is never admitted. Marx's point about religion was that, at worst, it caused man to lose himself; and, at best, it prevented him from finding himself. And the reason for this, according to Marx, is that organized religion proceeds on the premise that it makes man-that is, it makes him whole. In reacting to this assumption, Marxism holds that it is man who makes religion, and he has the power to unmake (i.e. to unmask) it. The Egyptian theoreticians sidestep this issue and reinforce Islam's basically ethical positions. Accordingly, they deny that religion at its most noble and perfect state exploits man and causes his alienation. To the contrary, man can only find himself by communing with God.
How socialist is Egyptian socialism ? This is a question that has been on the tongue of many people, both within Egypt and outside the country.
In particular, what is its relationship to Marxism, since, in the words of one leading authority on Middle East politics, 'the study of ideology has received its greatest impetus from Marx .. .62 In the realm of metaphysics it has been shown, the two systems share some common premises and even conclusions about man. Yet, they remain distinct from one another, and this is attributable in the last analysis to the significant gaps in the respective historical background and foundations of European and Middle East societies.
